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    Rationality speaks to the question of mental realism but ... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Rationality speaks to the question of mental realism but does not account for mental anomalism

    Consciousness & Mind
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Mental anomalism is explained by the general thesis about causally defined properties, not by rationality
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    • 2.The normative character of mental concepts — their responsiveness to the principle of charity and the ideal of rationality — provides grounds for continuing to employ mental concepts rather than eliminating them
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Davidson's own account in 'Mental Events' ties anomalism directly to the constitutive role of rationality in mental attribution.
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    • 2.If rationality norms are constitutive of the mental, then the very indeterminacy that generates anomalism is inseparable from those norms.
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    • 3.Therefore rationality does explanatory work in grounding anomalism, contra the claim's strict separation.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.McDowell and Hornsby argue that the normative holism of the mental — which rationality underwrites — is precisely what resists strict psychophysical laws.
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    • 2.A property that resists lawlike reduction because it is normatively constituted is anomalous partly in virtue of that normative constitution.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    2 topics

    Causation1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    A property that resists lawlike reduction because it is normatively constituted ...Davidson's own account in 'Mental Events' ties anomalism directly to the constit...If rationality norms are constitutive of the mental, then the very indeterminacy...McDowell and Hornsby argue that the normative holism of the mental — which ratio...
    +3 moreShow less
    Mental anomalism is explained by the general thesis about causally defined prope...The normative character of mental concepts — their responsiveness to the princip...Therefore rationality does explanatory work in grounding anomalism, contra the c...

    Similar

    Therefore, no such adequate analysis can be formulated within the cons...84%The mental is open in nature, entailing psychological anomalism.84%Uncodifiability of rationality is a red herring in McDowell's argument...84%The salvageable part of McDowell's argument for mental anomalism ultim...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: anomalous-monism
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    With regard to the first issue, there is some evidence that Davidson is confusing two distinct questions: why mental concepts cannot stand in lawlike relation to physical concepts, and why mental concepts cannot be eliminated in favor of physical concepts in the explanation of human behavior. Given the general thesis about causally defined properties, we have an understanding of why mental concepts are anomic. But this leaves open the question whether we ought to continue to traffic in anomic co
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit