Reasons internal to a concept (analytic reasons or reasons grounded in the nature of the substance) are of a different kind than reasons that appeal to comparisons between worlds in terms of relative perfections.
Grounded in the nature of the substance(refers to reasons that come from an object's essential properties)
Reasons that are rooted in what something fundamentally is or how it's made—for example, why water freezes at certain temperatures is grounded in the nature of water molecules.
Relative perfections(used to evaluate reasons by asking which world or situation is better or more perfect)
The idea of ranking or comparing how 'good,' 'complete,' or 'excellent' different things are compared to each other.
concept(Empiricist tradition)
A mental representation formed from copies of sensory representations, assembled in accordance with general-purpose learning rules.
In some texts, Leibniz suggests that the sufficient reason for contingent truths cannot be found in the concepts or natures of things. We must instead look to the Principle of the Best (Mon. 36–38/G VI, 613). In other words the sufficient reason for any contingent proposition of the form “a is F” is that a is F is true in the best possible word. This appears to be an entirely different sort of reason than the fact that “a is F” is analytic or that the nature of a determines that it is F. Those r