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    Reducing the value of each round lowers the payoff from d... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consequentialism
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    Supports→Players in a repeated game may establish commitment by reducing the value of each round so that the temptation to defect never becomes strong enough to override concern for reputation.

    Reducing the value of each round lowers the payoff from defection relative to the long-run value of reputation.

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract
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    ConsequentialismSocial Contract

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    Players in a repeated game may establish commitment by reducing the value of eac...Reputation can be built up only through play of a repeated game.The value of reputation must be greater to its cultivator than the value of sacr...

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    There are cases in which the payoff from defecting in a current round ...87%When the short-term defection payoff dominates the long-run reputation...83%When defection payoffs are small, the temptation to renege does not ou...81%Players in a repeated game may establish commitment by reducing the va...81%

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    Certain conditions must hold if reputation effects are to underwrite commitment. A person’s reputation can have a standing value across a range of games she plays, but in that case her concern for its value should be factored into payoffs in specifying each specific game into which she enters. Reputation can be built up through play of a game only in a case of a repeated game. Then the value of the reputation must be greater to its cultivator than the value to her of sacrificing it in any partic

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