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    Reduction requires not just referential identity but also... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Even if mental terms and neural terms refer to the same states, the mental is not reduced to the neural if mental concepts cannot be neurally explained.

    Reduction requires not just referential identity but also conceptual explicability in the vocabulary of the reducing science.

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

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    Coreference of mental and neural terms is insufficient for reduction if the ment...Even if mental terms and neural terms refer to the same states, the mental is no...

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    Another motivation for believing that conceptual issues are crucial for reduction stems from the idea that the identity of properties or kinds expressed by two predicates P1 and P2 manifests in the fact that there is an a priori route from P1 to P2. This interpretation is implicit in the received view attacked early on by Smart (1959). It also plays a role in Levine 1993, 1998 and Chalmers 1996; the idea is that for reductions to be explanatory, they must not leave out any aspect of the phenomen

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