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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Reid's second argument for moral liberty fails if the sole purposes of punishment are preventative rather than retributive

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Even purely preventative theories of punishment presuppose that the agent punished is the *kind* of entity capable of being deterred by reasons.
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    • 2.An agent who lacks moral liberty—whose actions are entirely determined by prior causes—cannot be genuinely responsive to the reason-giving force of threatened sanctions.
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    • 3.Therefore, Reid's argument survives the preventative turn: moral liberty is required not to ground desert but to ground the rational efficacy of deterrence itself.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes framework shows that practices of punishment are embedded in participant stances that cannot be reduced to purely forward-looking consequentialist aims.
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    • 2.Retributive intuitions are not eliminable add-ons to punishment but constitutive features of the moral practice that gives punishment its meaning, as Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' demonstrates.
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    • 3.The conditional 'if purposes of punishment are exhausted by prevention' assumes a reductive possibility that Strawsonian analysis shows is philosophically unavailable to us.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Reid's second argument depends on a retributivist conception of punishment
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    • 2.Under retributivism, punishment is appropriate only if it is deserved
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    • 3.Under retributivism, punishment is never deserved if the crime was not efficiently caused by the agent being punished
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