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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Reid's second argument for moral liberty fails if the sol... — Carmelics
    Home/Justice & Punishment
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Reid's second argument for moral liberty fails if the sole purposes of punishment are preventative rather than retributive

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeJustice & Punishment
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Reid's second argument depends on a retributivist conception of punishment
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    • 2.Under retributivism, punishment is appropriate only if it is deserved
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    • 3.Under retributivism, punishment is never deserved if the crime was not efficiently caused by the agent being punished
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Even purely preventative theories of punishment presuppose that the agent punished is the *kind* of entity capable of being deterred by reasons.
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    • 2.An agent who lacks moral liberty—whose actions are entirely determined by prior causes—cannot be genuinely responsive to the reason-giving force of threatened sanctions.
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    • 3.Therefore, Reid's argument survives the preventative turn: moral liberty is required not to ground desert but to ground the rational efficacy of deterrence itself.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes framework shows that practices of punishment are embedded in participant stances that cannot be reduced to purely forward-looking consequentialist aims.
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    • 2.Retributive intuitions are not eliminable add-ons to punishment but constitutive features of the moral practice that gives punishment its meaning, as Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' demonstrates.
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    • 3.The conditional 'if purposes of punishment are exhausted by prevention' assumes a reductive possibility that Strawsonian analysis shows is philosophically unavailable to us.
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    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Moral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    An agent who lacks moral liberty—whose actions are entirely determined by prior ...Even purely preventative theories of punishment presuppose that the agent punish...If purposes of punishment are exhausted by prevention rather than desert, the re...P.F. Strawson's reactive attitudes framework shows that practices of punishment ...
    +6 moreShow less
    Reid's second argument depends on a retributivist conception of punishmentRetributive intuitions are not eliminable add-ons to punishment but constitutive...The conditional 'if purposes of punishment are exhausted by prevention' assumes ...Therefore, Reid's argument survives the preventative turn: moral liberty is requ...Under retributivism, punishment is appropriate only if it is deservedUnder retributivism, punishment is never deserved if the crime was not efficient...

    Similar

    Reid's second argument depends on a retributivist conception of punish...85%If purposes of punishment are exhausted by prevention rather than dese...81%The argument that retributivism justifies punishment better than conse...79%The argument that retributivism justifies punishment better than conse...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: reid
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    The first argument for moral liberty depends upon the inadequacy of any account of deliberation that leaves out the belief that our conduct is in our power. So the second depends upon the inadequacy of any account of what makes a person morally accountable that does not include the power to control action. Someone who wished to deny that human beings have power over their conduct, but are still morally accountable, might note, for instance, that one of the primary purposes of certain forms of pu
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit