Relative identity theorists like Geach (1967) show that 'same F' judgments can yield different verdicts for different sortals applied to the same objects, undermining any privileged identity claim Carter asserts.

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Geach (1967)(as a cited philosophical source): Peter Geach, a 20th-century philosopher who wrote influential work arguing that identity is relative to different categories or types of things; the year 1967 refers to when this particular work was published.
Privileged identity claim(as a claim that identity has one ultimate truth): An idea that there's one special or correct answer to the question 'are these things identical?' rather than multiple possible answers depending on how you look at it.
Relative identity theorist(describing a philosophical position on identity): A philosopher who believes that whether two things are 'the same' depends on what kind of thing you're talking about—so the same object might be 'the same' in one way but 'different' in another way.
Same F(as a technical way to discuss identity claims): A judgment about whether two things are 'the same' when you plug in a specific category in place of 'F'—for example, 'the same person' or 'the same statue' would be different 'same F' judgments.

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