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    Carter's argument against the claim that S and S' are ide... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Carter's argument against the claim that S and S' are identical fails

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Carter's argument presupposes a determinate answer to ship identity before evaluating the competing candidates, committing a petitio principii.
      ?

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    • 2.Wiggins (1980) establishes that identity judgments require a sortal concept, and Carter supplies no principled sortal that privileges O over S as the 'same ship' as the original.
      ?

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    • 3.Without an independent criterion for ship-continuity that doesn't already encode the conclusion, Carter's identification of O with the original ship is question-begging by Chisholm's own standards of circular reasoning.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Relative identity theorists like Geach (1967) show that 'same F' judgments can yield different verdicts for different sortals applied to the same objects, undermining any privileged identity claim Carter asserts.
      ?

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    • 2.If S and S' satisfy all functional and structural criteria for ship-identity equally well, the burden of proof lies with Carter to supply a non-arbitrary reason to prefer O's identity with the original, which he does not provide.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Carter (1987) claims in effect that S and S' are not identical
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    • 2.Carter's argument simply assumes that O and S are the same ship, which is the very point at issue
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    Carter (1987) claims in effect that S and S' are not identicalCarter's argument presupposes a determinate answer to ship identity before evalu...Carter's argument simply assumes that O and S are the same ship, which is the ve...If S and S' satisfy all functional and structural criteria for ship-identity equ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Relative identity theorists like Geach (1967) show that 'same F' judgments can y...Wiggins (1980) establishes that identity judgments require a sortal concept, and...Without an independent criterion for ship-continuity that doesn't already encode...

    Similar

    Therefore C and D must be identical, contradicting the hypothesis that...91%Carter (1987) claims in effect that S and S' are not identical88%Therefore Rab and Rba would be identical, which contradicts their dist...88%Carter's argument simply assumes that O and S are the same ship, which...87%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-relative
    View source passageHide passage
    Kripke’s reasoning can be applied to the present case (Kripke and others might dispute this claim; see below). Let \(w\) be a possible world just like the actual world in that \(O\), the original ship, is manufactured exactly as it is in the actual world. In \(w\), however, another ship, \(S'\), exactly similar to \(O\), is simultaneously built out of precisely the same parts that \(S\), the remodeled ship, is built out of in the actual world. Since \(S'\) and \(O\) are clearly different ships i
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit