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    Representationalist accounts (Tye, Dretske) hold that phe... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experiences share a common phenomenal character, then conscious experiences are not to be individuated solely by phenomenal character

    Representationalist accounts (Tye, Dretske) hold that phenomenal character is fully determined by the intentional content of experience, not by object-constituency.

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    If veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experiences share a common phe...

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