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    If veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experie... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    If veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experiences share a common phenomenal character, then conscious experiences are not to be individuated solely by phenomenal character

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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Veridical visual experiences have seen objects as constituents while hallucinatory experiences do not
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    • 2.Two experiences can share phenomenal character while differing in their object-constituents
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Phenomenal character just is the subjective 'what it's like' quality, which by definition exhausts the intrinsic nature of experience.
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    • 2.If two experiences are phenomenally indistinguishable from the inside, they share all phenomenally relevant properties, leaving no residue for further individuation.
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    • 3.The disjunctivist move of positing unseen objects as constituents smuggles in non-phenomenal facts to do the individuation work, changing the subject from phenomenology to metaphysics.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Representationalist accounts (Tye, Dretske) hold that phenomenal character is fully determined by the intentional content of experience, not by object-constituency.
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    • 2.If hallucinatory and veridical experiences share the same narrow intentional content, they thereby share the same phenomenal character and are correctly individuated by it alone.
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    • 3.The disjunctivist's appeal to object-constituency conflates the metaphysical question of what makes an experience veridical with the phenomenological question of what individuates its character.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Key Terms

    Conscious experiences(as used in philosophy of mind)
    The subjective feelings and awareness you have—like seeing red, feeling pain, or tasting coffee—the 'what it's like' to experience something.
    Hallucinatory experiences(as used in philosophy of perception)
    Experiences where your mind perceives something that isn't actually there—like seeing a unicorn when no unicorn exists.
    individuated(Chodorow's account of boys' psychological development)
    Feeling oneself to be separate or distinct from others, as a result of identifying with an absent parent
    phenomenal character(Used to distinguish the mere presence of experience from the specific qualitative nature of individual experiences)
    The qualitative, subjective 'what it is like' aspect of mental states; the property of having qualia
    veridical(Used to describe experiences whose content matches reality)
    Accurate; correctly representing how things are

    Related

    If hallucinatory and veridical experiences share the same narrow intentional con...If two experiences are phenomenally indistinguishable from the inside, they shar...Phenomenal character just is the subjective 'what it's like' quality, which by d...Representationalist accounts (Tye, Dretske) hold that phenomenal character is fu...
    +4 moreShow less
    The disjunctivist move of positing unseen objects as constituents smuggles in no...The disjunctivist's appeal to object-constituency conflates the metaphysical que...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia
    View source passageHide passage
    Sometimes relationists try to motivate their view by arguing that since the seen objects are constituents of veridical visual experiences and they are not in the case of hallucinatory experiences, the experiences in the two cases must themselves be different. However, even if this is correct, it does not follow that they cannot share the same phenomenal character. What follows is rather that if they do share a common phenomenal character, then the conscious experiences are not to be individuated
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Two experiences can share phenomenal character while differing in their object-c...
    Veridical visual experiences have seen objects as constituents while hallucinato...

    Similar

    Veridical visual experiences and hallucinatory experiences must themse...87%Veridical visual experiences have seen objects as constituents while h...84%Two experiences can share phenomenal character while differing in thei...82%The distinctive aspect of visual consciousness is determined by the ma...80%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit