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    Requiring acquaintance with both a probability-maker and ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable relation is necessary—is a plausible reply that does not collapse into phenomenal conservatism.

    Requiring acquaintance with both a probability-maker and the making-probable relation generates a vicious regress, since acquaintance with the relation itself demands further epistemic grounding per Sellars's critique of the given.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Sellars showed that justifying knowledge by appeal to 'the given' requires justifying our grasp of that given, creating infinite regress.
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    • 2.Relations like 'makes probable' are abstract entities requiring epistemic access via acquaintance, not reducible to their relata alone.
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    • 3.Without independent grounding for relational knowledge, probability-talk reduces to bare assertion rather than justified belief.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Understanding 'makes probable' need not require acquaintance with it as a discrete entity—grasp emerges from mastering inferential rules.
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    • 2.Sellars's regress argument targets propositional justification, not the non-propositional competence underlying relational cognition.
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    • 3.Probability relations may be epistemically grounded in their functional role within successful prediction, avoiding infinite regress.
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    Key Terms

    Epistemic grounding(epistemology)
    The logical foundation or justification that explains why you're allowed to believe something; basically, the reasons or evidence that make a belief valid.
    Probability-maker(philosophy of probability)
    Something that makes an event or claim more likely to be true; the underlying reason or fact that increases the chances of something happening.
    Sellars's critique of the given(epistemology)
    Philosopher Wilfrid Sellars's argument that you cannot simply point to raw facts or experiences as self-justifying proof—everything requires explanation and context, nothing is automatically justified just by being experienced.
    Sellars, Wilfrid(history of philosophy)
    A 20th-century American philosopher famous for challenging the idea that some beliefs are automatically justified just by what we experience directly.
    acquaintance(Russell's epistemology of singular reference)
    Russell's form of demonstrative identification, in which a subject is directly presented with an object (typically sense data) rather than an extra-mental individual
    vicious regress(Used by Ryle as a reductio against intellectualist accounts of intelligence)
    An explanatory regress in which each explanatory step requires a further step of the same kind, preventing the explanation from ever being completed.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable ...Probability relations may be epistemically grounded in their functional role wit...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Relations like 'makes probable' are abstract entities requiring epistemic access...
    Sellars showed that justifying knowledge by appeal to 'the given' requires justi...
    +3 moreShow less
    Sellars's regress argument targets propositional justification, not the non-prop...Understanding 'makes probable' need not require acquaintance with it as a discre...Without independent grounding for relational knowledge, probability-talk reduces...