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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Russell is better able to handle the reduplication argument than the Fregean

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Gareth Evans argued in 'The Varieties of Reference' that genuine singular thought requires a robust information-preserving causal link to the object itself, not merely to its sensory effects.
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    • 2.A Russellian logically proper name must directly acquaint the thinker with the named object, but acquaintance with sense data mediates rather than constitutes acquaintance with Bill as an extra-mental particular.
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    • 3.Therefore the Russellian solution merely relocates the reduplication problem one level inward rather than dissolving it, leaving the account no better off than the Fregean.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Sense data are themselves individuated by their qualitative character, so two subjectively identical sense data streams cannot ground determinate reference to numerically distinct causes.
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    • 2.If Bill and Bill* produce phenomenally indistinguishable sense data in Sally, her demonstrative reference to 'these sense data' fails to privilege Bill over Bill* as the referent of her thought.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Sally can demonstratively identify her sense data that are caused by Bill and not Bill*
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    • 2.Sally employs a descriptive condition that contains direct reference to her occurrent sense data
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    • 3.This descriptive condition (though not purely qualitative) is one that Bill satisfies and Bill* does not
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