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Inverse View
It is not the case that Ruth Millikan's teleosemantic theory entails that the proper function of a mental state is fixed by its evolutionary history, not its proximate causal role.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Mental states influence behavior through proximate neural mechanisms; evolutionary history is causally inert regarding current mental function.
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2.
Teleosemantic theory struggles with novel thoughts and learned behaviors that have no evolutionary history but possess clear intentional content.
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3.
Content should be individuated by what determines rational inference; proximate computational role better explains cognitive systematicity than ancestry.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Mental content must have determinate meaning; proximate causes alone allow multiple physical systems identical in causal role to differ in content.
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2.
Evolutionary history explains why certain neural patterns reliably carry information about distal environmental features, grounding intentionality.
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3.
Brain transplants and teleportation intuitions show content tracks origin, not current causation, supporting historical dependence.
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