Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Ryle does not view the disposition-manifestation relation... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→Ryle's dispositionalism is excluded from functionalist accounts of belief that require a causal relationship between belief states and their behavioral manifestations.

    Ryle does not view the disposition-manifestation relationship causally.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Functionalism about belief requires a causal relationship between the belief sta...Ryle's dispositionalism is excluded from functionalist accounts of belief that r...

    Similar

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Consciousness & Mind
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Ryle's dispositionalism is excluded from functionalist accounts of bel...81%Physical theory only tells us about the dispositional properties of ph...78%The dispositional theory of meaning is false.78%Ginsborg's dispositionalism fails.78%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: belief
    View source passageHide passage
    As the list of names of the previous paragraph suggests, functionalism is compatible with either a representationalist approach to belief (as in Fodor) or an interpretationist one (as in Dennett). (The interpretationist, of course, will have to treat the relevant functional states as posits of an interpretative theory or scheme.) Dispositional accounts of belief, too, can be functionalist. Indeed, dispositional accounts can be seen as a special or limiting case of functional accounts. To see thi

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective