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    Ryle's dispositionalism is excluded from functionalist ac... — Carmelics
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    Ryle's dispositionalism is excluded from functionalist accounts of belief that require a causal relationship between belief states and their behavioral manifestations.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Functionalism, as articulated by Lewis and Armstrong, defines mental states by their causal roles connecting stimuli, behavior, and other states.
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    • 2.Ryle explicitly rejects inner causal states, treating dispositions as inference-licensing conditionals rather than causally efficacious entities.
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    • 3.A view that denies causal efficacy to belief states cannot satisfy the causal-role identity conditions that functionalism requires for belief individuation.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Fodor's critique of behaviorism demonstrates that disposition-talk without causal underpinning fails to explain the productivity and systematicity of belief.
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    • 2.Rylean dispositions are defined purely by stimulus-response regularities, making them extensionally equivalent to behaviorism and thus subject to Fodor's causal objections.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Functionalism about belief requires a causal relationship between the belief state and its manifestations in behavior or other mental states.
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    • 2.Ryle does not view the disposition-manifestation relationship causally.
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    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A view that denies causal efficacy to belief states cannot satisfy the causal-ro...Fodor's critique of behaviorism demonstrates that disposition-talk without causa...Functionalism about belief requires a causal relationship between the belief sta...Functionalism, as articulated by Lewis and Armstrong, defines mental states by t...
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    Ryle does not view the disposition-manifestation relationship causally.Ryle explicitly rejects inner causal states, treating dispositions as inference-...Rylean dispositions are defined purely by stimulus-response regularities, making...

    Similar

    McGinn's argument against dispositionalism rests on specific assumptio...83%A liberal dispositionalist may reject the functionalist commitment to ...82%Ryle does not view the disposition-manifestation relationship causally...81%The dispositional theory of meaning is false.80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: belief
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    As the list of names of the previous paragraph suggests, functionalism is compatible with either a representationalist approach to belief (as in Fodor) or an interpretationist one (as in Dennett). (The interpretationist, of course, will have to treat the relevant functional states as posits of an interpretative theory or scheme.) Dispositional accounts of belief, too, can be functionalist. Indeed, dispositional accounts can be seen as a special or limiting case of functional accounts. To see thi
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit