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    Scanlon's view of well-being does not constitute a theory... — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Scanlon's view of well-being does not constitute a theory of well-being

    Truth & KnowledgeVirtue Ethics
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A theory of well-being must explain what unifies its different elements and how those elements are to be compared
      ?

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    • 2.Scanlon's view does not explain what unifies its elements (success in rational aims, personal relations) or how they are to be compared
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A philosophical account need not provide a unifying criterion to count as a theory; systematic reflection on the constituents of well-being suffices.
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    • 2.Scanlon's view systematically identifies and defends specific categories of prudential value, which meets the minimal threshold for theoretical status.
      ?

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    • 3.Parfit's taxonomy of theories itself accommodates pluralist accounts that resist reduction, suggesting incommensurability is compatible with genuine theorizing.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The demand for a unifying principle presupposes monism, but well-established pluralist theories like Griffin's informed desire account also resist full unification.
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    • 2.If Griffin's account qualifies as a theory despite lacking a master-principle, then Scanlon's structurally similar pluralism cannot be excluded on those grounds alone.
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    Topics

    Virtue EthicsTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A philosophical account need not provide a unifying criterion to count as a theo...A theory of well-being must explain what unifies its different elements and how ...If Griffin's account qualifies as a theory despite lacking a master-principle, t...Parfit's taxonomy of theories itself accommodates pluralist accounts that resist...
    +3 moreShow less
    Scanlon's view does not explain what unifies its elements (success in rational a...Scanlon's view systematically identifies and defends specific categories of prud...The demand for a unifying principle presupposes monism, but well-established plu...

    Similar

    No theory of well-being is likely to be available83%A theory of well-being would need to explain what unifies its elements...82%We often make claims about what is good in our lives without referring...82%A theory of well-being must explain what unifies its different element...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: well-being
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    One immediately odd aspect of Scanlon’s position that ‘well-being’ is an otiose notion in ethics is that he himself seems to have a view on what well-being is. It involves, he believes, among other things, success in one’s rational aims, and personal relations. But Scanlon claims that his view is not a ‘theory of well-being’, since a theory must explain what unifies these different elements, and how they are to be compared. And, he adds, no such theory is ever likely to be available, since such
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit