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    Schiffer's 'something from nothing' objection holds that ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) is equivalent to a nominalist paraphrase sentence (N) and that neither entails the existence of a property.

    Schiffer's 'something from nothing' objection holds that trivial inferences like 'x is courageous, therefore x has the property of courage' are valid.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Property ascriptions like 'courage' are just reformulations of predicates already contained in the premise 'x is courageous'.
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    • 2.Logic permits inferences where the conclusion merely unpacks or makes explicit what was implicitly present in the premise.
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    • 3.Denying such trivial inferences would undermine basic analytic practices in philosophy and semantics.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The inference commits a type-token confusion: adjectives and abstract nouns refer to different logical categories.
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    • 2.Valid inference requires the conclusion to add genuine content; mere relabeling of existing terms lacks inferential substance.
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    • 3.Accepting such trivial inferences threatens to collapse distinctions between linguistic paraphrase and logical entailment.
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    Related

    Accepting such trivial inferences threatens to collapse distinctions between lin...Denying such trivial inferences would undermine basic analytic practices in phil...Logic permits inferences where the conclusion merely unpacks or makes explicit w...Paraphrase nominalism holds that a property-predication sentence (P) is equivale...
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    Property ascriptions like 'courage' are just reformulations of predicates alread...The inference commits a type-token confusion: adjectives and abstract nouns refe...Valid inference requires the conclusion to add genuine content; mere relabeling ...

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