Searle's account of collective intentionality holds that 'I intend that we X' is only coherent as a genuine we-intention when it is already embedded in a pre-reflective sense of shared agency, not derivable from individual predictive reasoning.
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John Searle is an American philosopher famous for asking whether machines can truly think and understand things the way humans do. He argued that just because a computer can process information and respond correctly doesn't mean it actually *understands* what it's doing—like how someone could follow instructions to respond in Chinese without actually knowing the language. His ideas have deeply influenced debates about artificial intelligence and what makes human consciousness unique.
Shared agency(as the foundation for genuine we-intentions)
The sense that you and others are working together as a unit, with a feeling of 'we're doing this together' that's felt rather than reasoned out.
We-intention(as distinct from multiple individual intentions)
A genuine shared intention where a group intends to do something together as a team, not just a bunch of individuals happening to want the same thing.