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    Seemings must be non-belief states, not beliefs themselves — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
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    Seemings must be non-belief states, not beliefs themselves

    Perception
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Seemings play the epistemological role of conferring justification on basic beliefs
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    • 2.If seemings were themselves beliefs, the beliefs justified by seemings would not be basic beliefs
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Beliefs can justify other beliefs without undermining basicality, as coherentist and reliabilist accounts demonstrate.
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    • 2.If justificatory basicality does not require non-doxastic sources, seemings-as-beliefs can still ground non-inferential justification.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Perceptual seemings exhibit intentional content, functional integration, and revisability under reflection—hallmarks of doxastic states on dispositional belief accounts.
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    • 2.Phenomenal conservatism's insistence on a sui generis non-belief seeming-state multiplies mental ontology beyond what the epistemic data require, violating parsimony.
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    Perception

    Related

    Beliefs can justify other beliefs without undermining basicality, as coherentist...If justificatory basicality does not require non-doxastic sources, seemings-as-b...If seemings were themselves beliefs, the beliefs justified by seemings would not...Perceptual seemings exhibit intentional content, functional integration, and rev...
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    Phenomenal conservatism's insistence on a sui generis non-belief seeming-state m...Seemings play the epistemological role of conferring justification on basic beli...

    Similar

    A state that is itself a justified belief is not a nondoxastic foundat...78%Perceptions justify beliefs because of what kind of mental states they...73%Privilege foundationalism classifies belief (H) as nonbasic because th...73%If seemings were themselves beliefs, the beliefs justified by seemings...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: perception-episprob
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    Perhaps the most important problem for this view concerns the relevant understanding of seemings, or perceptual experience. It is clear that seemings must be non-belief states of some sort, as their epistemological role is to confer justification on basic beliefs, and the latter wouldn’t be basic if seemings were themselves beliefs. The “Sellarsian dilemma” is a famous argument, due perhaps as much to BonJour (1978, 1985) as to Sellars (1956), which claims that “experience” and “seemings” and th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit