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Inverse View
It is not the case that Seemings must be non-belief states, not beliefs themselves
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Reasons For
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Reason for 1 of 2
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1.
Beliefs can justify other beliefs without undermining basicality, as coherentist and reliabilist accounts demonstrate.
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2.
If justificatory basicality does not require non-doxastic sources, seemings-as-beliefs can still ground non-inferential justification.
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Reason for 2 of 2
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1.
Perceptual seemings exhibit intentional content, functional integration, and revisability under reflection—hallmarks of doxastic states on dispositional belief accounts.
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2.
Phenomenal conservatism's insistence on a sui generis non-belief seeming-state multiplies mental ontology beyond what the epistemic data require, violating parsimony.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Seemings play the epistemological role of conferring justification on basic beliefs
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2.
If seemings were themselves beliefs, the beliefs justified by seemings would not be basic beliefs
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