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    Seemings or appearances are distinct from beliefs. — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Seemings or appearances are distinct from beliefs.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Once one is familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion, one no longer believes that the two lines are of unequal length, yet the lines still appear to be unequal.
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    • 2.The same pattern holds for apparent intuitions and apparent memories that one becomes convinced are false: the seeming persists even after the belief is retracted.
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    • 3.Beliefs are subject to epistemic norms and can be supported by epistemic reasons, whereas it does not make sense to say the same of appearances.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Doxastic theories (e.g., Pitcher, Armstrong) identify perceptual experience with a set of beliefs or belief-like states about the environment.
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    • 2.The Müller-Lyer case can be explained as a conflict between a persistent sub-doxastic or tacit belief and a reflectively held explicit belief, not a belief-appearance gap.
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    • 3.If seemings are functionally individuated by their inferential role and behavioral dispositions, no principled distinction from belief-states remains.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wilfrid Sellars argued in 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' that all awareness, including perceptual seeming, is already conceptually structured and hence doxastic in character.
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    • 2.If seemings necessarily inherit their content from the conceptual repertoire of the perceiver, they are not categorically distinct from belief but rather a species of it.
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    • 3.The alleged epistemic asymmetry between beliefs and appearances dissolves if normative assessment applies to how one deploys concepts in perceptual uptake, as Sellars's argument implies.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge2 linked

    Related

    Beliefs are subject to epistemic norms and can be supported by epistemic reasons...Doxastic theories (e.g., Pitcher, Armstrong) identify perceptual experience with...If seemings are functionally individuated by their inferential role and behavior...If seemings necessarily inherit their content from the conceptual repertoire of ...
    +5 moreShow less
    Once one is familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion, one no longer believes that ...The Müller-Lyer case can be explained as a conflict between a persistent sub-dox...The alleged epistemic asymmetry between beliefs and appearances dissolves if nor...The same pattern holds for apparent intuitions and apparent memories that one be...Wilfrid Sellars argued in 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' that all aware...

    Similar

    Perceptual beliefs are based on appearance beliefs88%Justifying an appearance belief requires more than mere non-conceptual...86%Any justification an appearance lends to a belief in the corresponding...82%Therefore appearance has a form of existence that prevents it from bei...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: justep-foundational
    View source passageHide passage
    What exactly are these “seemings” or “appearances”? The distinction between seemings and beliefs is typically introduced with examples. Once we are familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion, we no longer believe that the lines are of unequal length even though, in some sense, they still appear to be unequal. The same holds for various apparent intuitions and apparent memories that we become convinced are false. Moreover, beliefs are subject to epistemic norms and can be supported by epistemic reaso
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit