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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Self-deceivers can be morally responsible for individual ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Self-deceivers can be morally responsible for individual episodes of self-deception or for the vices from which they spring

    Consciousness & MindMoral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Most non-intentionalist accounts allow for such responsibility
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    • 2.Moral responsibility requires that agents have control over the actions in question
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    • 3.Many sources of bias are controllable
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Self-deception constitutively involves the agent being unaware of the motivated reasoning driving their belief formation.
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    • 2.Moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have recognized and reflectively endorsed or rejected the process producing it.
      ?

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    • 3.An agent cannot exercise the requisite control over a cognitive process whose operation is systematically hidden from their reflective awareness.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Alfred Mele's 'cold' self-deception shows that many self-deceptive beliefs arise from normal cognitive biases like confirmation bias, requiring no motivated reasoning.
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    • 2.Agents cannot be held morally responsible for trait-level cognitive tendencies that are products of evolutionary pressures largely invariant across persons and cultures.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    Agents cannot be held morally responsible for trait-level cognitive tendencies t...Alfred Mele's 'cold' self-deception shows that many self-deceptive beliefs arise...An agent cannot exercise the requisite control over a cognitive process whose op...Many sources of bias are controllable
    +5 moreShow less
    Moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have recognized...Moral responsibility requires that agents have control over the actions in quest...Most non-intentionalist accounts allow for such responsibilitySelf-deceivers can recognize and resist the influence of emotion and desire on t...Self-deception constitutively involves the agent being unaware of the motivated ...

    Similar

    Self-deceivers typically lack the control necessary for moral responsi...93%Self-deceivers may be culpable when their self-deceptive beliefs induc...89%Self-deceivers may have an obligation to overcome self-deception even ...88%Moral responsibility for self-deception requires the kind of awareness...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: self-deception
    View source passageHide passage
    Initially, non-intentionalist approaches may seem to remove the agent from responsibility by rendering the process by which she is self-deceived subintentional. If my anxiety, fear, or desire triggers a process that ineluctably leads me to hold the self-deceptive belief, I cannot be held responsible for holding that belief. How can I be held responsible for processes that operate without my knowledge and which are set in motion without my intention? Most non-intentionalist accounts, however, do
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit