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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Self-verifying judgments satisfy the truth-tracking condition (TC) and therefore cannot be used to argue against self-knowledge via TC

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.In a counterfactual where a subject has twin water thoughts instead of water thoughts, the subject cannot believe they have water thoughts
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    • 2.A self-attribution expressed as 'I am thinking that water is wet' would inevitably attribute a twin water thought instead in such a counterfactual
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    • 3.Therefore the self-attribution tracks the truth perfectly in the counterfactual circumstances
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Burge's constitutive self-knowledge thesis holds that first-person thought ascriptions are authoritative precisely because thinking 'I think p' constitutes the very thought p it purports to track.
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    • 2.If the self-ascription constitutes rather than merely represents the thought, no gap exists between ascription and truth-maker across which TC-failure could arise.
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    • 3.Davidson's anomalous monism similarly entails that mental content is individuated holistically, making self-referential thought ascriptions immune to the divergence TC requires for epistemic failure.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Shoemaker's no-reference-failure principle establishes that first-person mental ascriptions cannot misidentify their subject, removing one dimension along which TC-relevant counterfactuals could generate false belief.
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    • 2.If the subject of a self-verifying judgment cannot be mistaken, then the only remaining axis of potential falsehood—content—is closed off by the self-verifying mechanism itself, exhausting all routes to TC-failure.
      ?

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