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    Simply positing God does not provide a theoretical soluti... — Carmelics
    Home/Natural Theology
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Simply positing God does not provide a theoretical solution to the Problem of Evil

    Natural Theology
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If God exists then there cannot be unnecessary evil, so there must be a solution to the Problem of Evil
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    • 2.However, merely positing God does not make it easier to theoretically reconcile apparent unnecessary evil with the nature of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent deity
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Theistic frameworks like Plantinga's Free Will Defense demonstrate that positing God generates specific logical resources unavailable to atheism.
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    • 2.The existence of a necessarily good God entails that evil must be explicable in terms of greater goods, transforming evil from brute fact to meaningful datum.
      ?

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    • 3.A brute-fact atheist worldview provides no theoretical framework at all for distinguishing necessary from unnecessary evil, making the Problem of Evil uniquely tractable within theism.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Swinburne's epistemic distance argument shows that God's existence entails principled reasons why divine hiddenness and permitted suffering would be expected features of reality.
      ?

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    • 2.If God's existence generates testable predictions about the structure of evil (soul-making, moral development), positing God has genuine explanatory power over rival hypotheses.
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    Topics

    Natural TheologyProblem of Evil

    Connections

    1 linked claim · 1 topic

    Divine Attributes2 linked
    Simply positing God does not theoretically solve the Problem of Evil

    Related

    A brute-fact atheist worldview provides no theoretical framework at all for dist...However, merely positing God does not make it easier to theoretically reconcile ...If God exists then there cannot be unnecessary evil, so there must be a solution...If God's existence generates testable predictions about the structure of evil (s...
    +4 moreShow less
    Simply positing God does not theoretically solve the Problem of EvilSwinburne's epistemic distance argument shows that God's existence entails princ...The existence of a necessarily good God entails that evil must be explicable in ...Theistic frameworks like Plantinga's Free Will Defense demonstrate that positing...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: relations
    View source passageHide passage
    Next, take (2). Maurin and Simons argue that if we reject Bradley’s assumption that relations are general entities, i.e. universals, and hold instead that relations are a special class of particular entities, i.e., non-transferable tropes, then we can avoid Bradley’s Regress. What is a relation conceived as a “non-transferable trope”? It’s a relation \(r_1\) that’s borne essentially by the things it relates and which could not have been borne by anything else (Simons 2002/3: 6). Suppose \(r_1\)
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit