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    Simultaneous causation does not require priority in time — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Even a God who exists in time could ground the existence of a series of contingent beings with no temporal beginning

    Simultaneous causation does not require priority in time

    CausationModality & Possibility
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    Modality & PossibilityCausation

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    Hume’s second objection is that God cannot be the causal explanation of the existence of a series of contingent beings that has no temporal beginning, since any causal relation “implies a priority in time and a beginning of existence” (Hume 1779, Part IV). In reply, it seems quite possible to conceive of a non-temporal causal relation, and thus to conceive of God, from outside of time, causing a series of contingent beings that has always existed. Indeed, this view is common in the theological t

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