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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Skyrms's work on the evolution of the social contract shows agents achieving (C,C) in genuine PD structures through correlated equilibria, without this implying the game was misidentified.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If agents reliably achieve (C,C) outcomes, the behavioral payoffs they actually receive diverge from PD's defining payoff structure.
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    • 2.Correlated equilibria require shared access to correlation signals—a structural feature absent from standard PD, suggesting game reidentification.
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    • 3.Skyrms's models typically include memory, repeated interactions, or signaling mechanisms that alter the underlying game structure itself.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Correlated equilibria can emerge from evolutionary dynamics without requiring external coordinators, making (C,C) achievable in genuine PD.
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    • 2.Game identification depends on payoff structures, not equilibrium outcomes. Skyrms shows equilibrium selection, not structural misidentification.
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    • 3.Historical social institutions (norms, signals) function as correlation devices that preserve PD's payoff matrix while enabling cooperation.
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