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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    Skyrms's work on the evolution of the social contract sho... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→If players in a game reach the (C,C) equilibrium under conditions where (C,C) and (D,D) are both Nash Equilibria, the correct description is that the Prisoner's Dilemma was the wrong model of their situation, not that they played non-Nash Equilibrium strategies in a Prisoner's Dilemma.

    Skyrms's work on the evolution of the social contract shows agents achieving (C,C) in genuine PD structures through correlated equilibria, without this implying the game was misidentified.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Correlated equilibria can emerge from evolutionary dynamics without requiring external coordinators, making (C,C) achievable in genuine PD.
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    • 2.Game identification depends on payoff structures, not equilibrium outcomes. Skyrms shows equilibrium selection, not structural misidentification.
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    • 3.Historical social institutions (norms, signals) function as correlation devices that preserve PD's payoff matrix while enabling cooperation.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.If agents reliably achieve (C,C) outcomes, the behavioral payoffs they actually receive diverge from PD's defining payoff structure.
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    • 2.Correlated equilibria require shared access to correlation signals—a structural feature absent from standard PD, suggesting game reidentification.
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    • 3.Skyrms's models typically include memory, repeated interactions, or signaling mechanisms that alter the underlying game structure itself.
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    Key Terms

    (C,C)(the outcome the agents achieve)
    Notation meaning both agents chose to cooperate (the C stands for 'cooperate'); this is the mutually beneficial outcome.
    Correlated equilibria(the mechanism by which cooperation happens)
    A situation where players can receive a recommendation (like a traffic light) about what move to make, and each player is better off following that recommendation than ignoring it.
    Evolution (in this context)(how the social contract develops)
    Here, it means how strategies and behaviors gradually develop and change over time, not biological evolution.
    Game theory(mathematics and philosophy)
    The mathematical study of strategic interactions where each person's outcome depends not just on their own choices, but on what other people choose to do.
    PD (Prisoner's Dilemma)(the game structure being discussed)
    A famous scenario in game theory where two people each have to choose between cooperating or betraying the other, and betrayal seems tempting even though both would do better by cooperating.
    Skyrms(the author being referenced)
    Brian Skyrms is a philosopher who studies how people's behavior and agreements evolve over time using math and game theory.
    agents(referring to people in this philosophical discussion)
    People, or more broadly, any thinking being capable of having beliefs and making decisions.
    social contract(Rawls's interpretation of the social contract tradition)
    A hypothetical situation or thought experiment designed to uncover the most reasonable principles of justice, not an actual historical event.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Correlated equilibria can emerge from evolutionary dynamics without requiring ex...Correlated equilibria require shared access to correlation signals—a structural ...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Game identification depends on payoff structures, not equilibrium outcomes. Skyr...
    Historical social institutions (norms, signals) function as correlation devices ...
    +3 moreShow less
    If agents reliably achieve (C,C) outcomes, the behavioral payoffs they actually ...If players in a game reach the (C,C) equilibrium under conditions where (C,C) an...Skyrms's models typically include memory, repeated interactions, or signaling me...