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    SLEs do not share the same kind of existence as concrete ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Challenges→Standard Linguistic Entities (SLEs) cannot be identified with physical (acoustic) spatio-temporal phenomena

    SLEs do not share the same kind of existence as concrete physical objects

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    SLEs are intentional inexistents — fictions of a particular sort — rather than r...Standard Linguistic Entities (SLEs) cannot be identified with physical (acoustic...

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    Despite the decline in interest in the ontology of language itself, philosophers have recently embraced a subset of this debate in the philosophy of linguistic objects with a special focus on words. There is a recent debate in philosophy on the philosophy of what Rey (2006, 2020) calls ‘Standard Linguistic Entities’ (SLEs) or tokens of word, sentence, morpheme, and phonemes types. Rey then defines a position called ’physical tokenism’ or PT as the assumption that SLEs can be identified with phys

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