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    Standard Linguistic Entities (SLEs) cannot be identified ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Standard Linguistic Entities (SLEs) cannot be identified with physical (acoustic) spatio-temporal phenomena

    Perception
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The same phonological word-type (e.g., 'bank') can be instantiated by acoustically distinct tokens differing in pitch, duration, and amplitude.
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    • 2.No two acoustic events share identical physical parameters, yet competent speakers recognize them as tokens of one and the same linguistic type.
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    • 3.Type-identity with a physical particular requires sharing all essential physical properties, which no abstract linguistic type can do with any single acoustic event.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Peirce's type-token distinction entails that linguistic types are abstract repeatable structures, not located at any single spatio-temporal coordinate.
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    • 2.A spatio-temporal particular cannot recur at multiple times and places simultaneously, but a single SLE such as the English word 'cat' does precisely this across all utterances.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.SLEs do not share the same kind of existence as concrete physical objects
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    • 2.SLEs are intentional inexistents — fictions of a particular sort — rather than real spatio-temporal entities
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguagePerception

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    A spatio-temporal particular cannot recur at multiple times and places simultane...No two acoustic events share identical physical parameters, yet competent speake...Peirce's type-token distinction entails that linguistic types are abstract repea...SLEs are intentional inexistents — fictions of a particular sort — rather than r...
    +3 moreShow less
    SLEs do not share the same kind of existence as concrete physical objectsThe same phonological word-type (e.g., 'bank') can be instantiated by acoustical...Type-identity with a physical particular requires sharing all essential physical...

    Similar

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: linguistics
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    Despite the decline in interest in the ontology of language itself, philosophers have recently embraced a subset of this debate in the philosophy of linguistic objects with a special focus on words. There is a recent debate in philosophy on the philosophy of what Rey (2006, 2020) calls ‘Standard Linguistic Entities’ (SLEs) or tokens of word, sentence, morpheme, and phonemes types. Rey then defines a position called ’physical tokenism’ or PT as the assumption that SLEs can be identified with phys
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit