Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Some metaphysical explanations are one-off phenomena, whe... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law) in nature.

    Some metaphysical explanations are one-off phenomena, where a similar mechanism need not have given rise to a similar phenomenon.

    CausationModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityCausation

    Related

    Deductive-nomological explanation requires that similar mechanisms give rise to ...Deductive-nomological models cannot accommodate one-off explanations.Metaphysical explanation cannot be entirely deductive-nomological (covering law)...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Modality & Possibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.

    Similar

    Deductive-nomological metaphysical explanation cannot account for rare...86%The quasi-causal model of metaphysical explanation is not the only ava...84%The analogy between grounding explanation and causal explanation assum...83%Even when a mechanism grounds or causes a phenomenon, a similar mechan...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: metaphysical-explanation
    View source passageHide passage
    Finally, if metaphysical explanation is deductive-nomological (or “covering law”), it seems that there is no room for explanations of rare or one-off phenomena in terms of the mechanisms that ground (or cause) them, even in cases where, had a similar mechanism occurred, it need not have given rise to a similar phenomenon (e.g., Taylor 2016). According to Trogdon (2018; see also Anscombe 1971), it seems likely that some explanations are one-off in this sense, from which it would seem to follow th

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective