Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Sounds are not one single kind of thing. — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Sounds are not one single kind of thing.

    PerceptionPhilosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Some sounds are pure audibilia bearing acoustic properties that can be disconnected from their material causes.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Some sounds are events or act-types that can lack acoustic properties and are perceivable by modalities other than audition.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.All candidate sound-types—wave events, property instances, audibilia—can be unified under a single relational ontology as disturbances in a medium relative to a perceiver.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The apparent heterogeneity of sounds reflects differences in descriptions or contexts of individuation, not genuine ontological plurality.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Casey O'Callaghan's own framework in 'Sounds: A Philosophical Theory' grounds all sounds as events in the medium, suggesting theoretical unity is achievable without remainder.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The argument from acoustic property-disconnection conflates a sound's intrinsic nature with its causal history, a distinction Aristotle's hylomorphic account of sound already navigates without positing kind-plurality.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Sounds perceived via non-auditory modalities (e.g., tactile vibration) are better classified as cross-modal representations of the same event-kind, not evidence of a distinct sound-kind.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguagePerception

    Related

    All candidate sound-types—wave events, property instances, audibilia—can be unif...Casey O'Callaghan's own framework in 'Sounds: A Philosophical Theory' grounds al...Some sounds are events or act-types that can lack acoustic properties and are pe...Some sounds are pure audibilia bearing acoustic properties that can be disconnec...
    +3 moreShow less
    Sounds perceived via non-auditory modalities (e.g., tactile vibration) are bette...The apparent heterogeneity of sounds reflects differences in descriptions or con...The argument from acoustic property-disconnection conflates a sound's intrinsic ...

    Similar

    Substratum is itself no kind of thing and therefore no kind of individ...83%There are no singular entities.78%Propositions are simple and have no constituents.75%'One' in the sense of uniqueness (having no partner of the same specie...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: sounds
    View source passageHide passage
    Soteriou (2018) claims that both versions of the event theory are too strict about what they count as sounds: the Located Event Theory counts as sounds only monadic events happening at material objects; the Relational Event Theory, instead, admits only relational events that are bearers of acoustic properties. Soteriou challenges the assumption that sounds are one kind of thing and suggests that the sounds we hear are both pure audibilia (such as the barking of a dog), which are events or act-ty
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit