The argument from acoustic property-disconnection conflates a sound's intrinsic nature with its causal history, a distinction Aristotle's hylomorphic account of sound already navigates without positing kind-plurality.
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Hylomorphic account(the specific theory being evaluated in the statement)
Aristotle's theory that all physical things are made of two parts: matter (the stuff something is made of) and form (the shape or structure that makes it what it is). For example, a clay statue has clay as matter and the shape of a person as form.
Intrinsic nature(Used in Armstrong's definition of internal relations)
The non-relational properties of an entity
Kind-plurality(as what Aristotle's theory avoids having to assume)
The existence of multiple different types or categories of things—claiming there are lots of separate kinds instead of fewer fundamental ones.
Property-disconnection(as the specific error the argument makes)
The idea that something's qualities or characteristics are separate or not properly connected to something else—in this case, sound's qualities being wrongly separated from something.