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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Stable institutions with relatively transparent rules are key conditions that help people more closely resemble straightforward economic agents, such that classical game theory finds reliable application to them as entire units

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Institutions are themselves products of strategic interaction and thus cannot serve as exogenous stabilizers of the very behavior they presuppose—Douglass North's institutional economics shows rules emerge from and are sustained by ongoing bargaining.
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    • 2.Transparent rules systematically disadvantage actors with fewer interpretive resources, producing strategic opacity for marginalized agents even within nominally stable institutions—Iris Marion Young's work on structural injustice demonstrates this asymmetry.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Behavioral economists like Kahneman and Thaler show that institutional framing systematically triggers loss-aversion and status quo bias, distorting rather than approximating rational agency.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.These distortions are not noise reducible by institutional design but are constitutive features of human cognition, making 'closer resemblance' to economic agents under stable rules an empirically false prediction.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The internal politics of the brain consists in logrolling — coalitional bargaining among internal interest subunits
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    • 2.These internal dynamics are partly regulated and stabilized by the wider social games in which coalitions are embedded
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    • 3.Social expectations about a person's role set behavioral equilibrium targets for the logrolling processes in that person's brain
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