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    Standard functionalist accounts cannot fully capture the ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Standard functionalist accounts cannot fully capture the representational content of mental states.

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Narrow functional role alone cannot distinguish Twin Earth water-thoughts from Earth water-thoughts, as Putnam's 1975 argument demonstrates.
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    • 2.Representational content is individuated by distal environmental relations, not internal causal organization, per Burge's anti-individualism.
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    • 3.Any account that misidentifies the content of water-thoughts fails to fully capture representational content, regardless of causal-role completeness.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Dretske's information-theoretic semantics requires that content-conferring causal connections be nomically reliable during a critical learning period, not throughout the state's causal career.
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    • 2.Functional role accounts that abstract away from this temporally indexed, nomic-reliability condition systematically underdetermine which property a state represents.
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    • 3.Underdetermination of represented property entails failure to fully capture representational content.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.The indicator function of an internal state depends, at least in part, on the evolutionary history or learning history of that state, not solely on its current causal dispositions.
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    • 2.Standard functionalist accounts are limited to appeal to a state's actual, potential, or typical causal roles.
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    • 3.Facts about evolutionary history or learning history are not reducible to causal role facts.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

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    Causation2 linked

    Related

    Any account that misidentifies the content of water-thoughts fails to fully capt...Dretske's information-theoretic semantics requires that content-conferring causa...Facts about evolutionary history or learning history are not reducible to causal...Functional role accounts that abstract away from this temporally indexed, nomic-...
    +5 moreShow less
    Narrow functional role alone cannot distinguish Twin Earth water-thoughts from E...Representational content is individuated by distal environmental relations, not ...Standard functionalist accounts are limited to appeal to a state's actual, poten...The indicator function of an internal state depends, at least in part, on the ev...Underdetermination of represented property entails failure to fully capture repr...

    Similar

    Standard functionalist accounts are limited to appeal to a state's act...81%Fodor's representationalism identifies belief with functional states t...80%A liberal dispositionalist may reject the functionalist commitment to ...79%A mental state counts as a representation only if it is consumed by ot...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: belief
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    The compatibility of functionalism and representationalism is not evident on its face, though a number of prominent contemporary philosophers appear to embrace both positions (e.g., Fodor 1968, 1975, 1981, 1990; Armstrong 1973; Harman 1973; Lycan 1981a, 1981b; Stalnaker 1984; Lewis 1994). As Millikan (1984), Papineau (1984), and others have suggested, it seems one thing to say that to believe is to be in a state that fills a particular causal role, and it seems quite another to say that beliefs
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit