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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Strong global supervenience entails intermediate global supervenience.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The entailment assumes isomorphisms between worlds are total and structure-preserving across all individuals, but worlds may lack a common domain of individuals.
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    • 2.Without a shared domain, 'B-preserving isomorphism' is undefined, so strong global supervenience's quantification over isomorphisms has no object to transmit A-preservation from.
      ?

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    • 3.If the antecedent of strong global supervenience is vacuously satisfied due to domain mismatch, intermediate global supervenience can still fail for worlds with non-overlapping individuals.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Intermediate global supervenience requires that if worlds are B-indiscernible, some B-preserving map between them is also A-preserving, but this is a weaker existential claim about maps, not a universal one.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Strong global supervenience's universal quantification over isomorphisms entails intermediate's existential claim only if at least one isomorphism exists, yet worlds with radically different cardinalities may share B-profiles with no isomorphism available.
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    • 3.Kim's own formulations in 'Supervenience and Mind' leave the existence of inter-world isomorphisms as a substantive metaphysical assumption, not a logical guarantee, breaking the entailment.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Strong global supervenience holds that every B-preserving isomorphism between two worlds must itself be A-preserving.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If every B-preserving isomorphism between two worlds must be A-preserving, then if any B-preserving isomorphisms exist between two worlds, at least one of them must be A-preserving.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The condition that at least one B-preserving isomorphism is A-preserving is exactly the condition required by intermediate global supervenience.
      ?

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