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    Stroud's own 1977 argument concedes that transcendental a... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Stroud's transcendental argument can at best establish a version of the causal theory in which 'independent' is read in a transcendentally ideal sense, not a fully mind-independent realist sense.

    Stroud's own 1977 argument concedes that transcendental arguments yield conclusions about how we must represent the world, not about world-as-it-is-in-itself.

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.Transcendental arguments trace necessary conditions for experience, not metaphysical facts about reality independent of cognition.
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    • 2.Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena shows that proving necessary representational structures doesn't establish noumenal properties.
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    • 3.Stroud correctly identifies that deriving 'we must represent X' from 'X is necessary for experience' doesn't entail 'X exists independently.'
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.If our representations must correspond to how we can represent things, this constrains what world-in-itself could be compatible with our cognition.
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    • 2.Stroud's concession conflates epistemological limits with metaphysical silence; we may still infer structural features of reality from representational necessity.
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    • 3.The claim that transcendental arguments yield only representational conclusions may itself require unprovable assumptions about mind-world separation.
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    Related

    If our representations must correspond to how we can represent things, this cons...Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena shows that proving necessary re...Stroud correctly identifies that deriving 'we must represent X' from 'X is neces...Stroud's concession conflates epistemological limits with metaphysical silence; ...
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    Stroud's transcendental argument can at best establish a version of the causal t...The claim that transcendental arguments yield only representational conclusions ...Transcendental arguments trace necessary conditions for experience, not metaphys...

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