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    Subjects like Jackson's Mary make genuine epistemic progr... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Supports→There exists a core phenomenal concept whose content is constituted by an underlying phenomenal or experiential quality with which the subject is acquainted.

    Subjects like Jackson's Mary make genuine epistemic progress upon having new phenomenal experiences.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    Such a concept would be a phenomenal concept grounded in acquaintance, not infer...There exists a core phenomenal concept whose content is constituted by an underl...This epistemic progress is difficult to explain unless there is a concept whose ...

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    McGrew is not alone in holding that experiential or phenomenal features can, by virtue of our direct awareness of them, constitute the content of a special class of concepts. Gertler (2001, 2011, 2012), Chalmers (2003, 2010), and Nida-Rümelin (2004) defend views very much in the same spirit. Gertler (2001) distinguishes between ordinary demonstratives, which typically involve an intention to pick out an entity that satisfies some description, and a pure demonstrative, which picks out its referen

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