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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Such arrangements can serve as a credible commitment devi... — Carmelics
    Home/Democracy & Governance
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Governments may prefer loan disbursement in small tranches even when it constrains their behavior.

    Such arrangements can serve as a credible commitment device that removes domestic political pressure for non-compliant use of the funds.

    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract
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    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract

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    Governments may prefer loan disbursement in small tranches even when it constrai...Receiving loans in small tranches reduces governments' incentives to violate loa...

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    A negotiating party can make a previously non-credible threat credible...73%A commitment device that makes defection costly can transform a non-cr...72%Interlocking arrangements provide member units with influence on centr...69%A coercive power capable of enforcing agreements removes the rational ...68%

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: game-theory
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    Certain conditions must hold if reputation effects are to underwrite commitment. A person’s reputation can have a standing value across a range of games she plays, but in that case her concern for its value should be factored into payoffs in specifying each specific game into which she enters. Reputation can be built up through play of a game only in a case of a repeated game. Then the value of the reputation must be greater to its cultivator than the value to her of sacrificing it in any partic

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