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    Supervenience is too weak a notion to constitute reductio... — Carmelics
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    Supervenience is too weak a notion to constitute reduction, even though supervenience is a necessary condition for reduction.

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Supervenience entails no explanatory connection: knowing B-facts fixes A-facts without explaining why or how, leaving the 'explanatory gap' fully intact.
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    • 2.Kim's causal exclusion argument shows supervenient properties lack causal efficacy, making them epiphenomenal rather than genuinely reduced to physical reality.
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    • 3.Reduction requires that higher-level properties be nothing over and above lower-level properties, but supervenience permits modal covariation without ontological identity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nagel's classical model of reduction demands derivability via bridge laws, establishing a logical-nomological connection that mere supervenience never provides.
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    • 2.Property identity theories like Lewis's and Armstrong's achieve strict monism precisely because they eliminate the supervening property rather than merely correlating it with its base.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If mental states merely supervene on physiological states, mental states exist over and above physiological states in a straightforward sense.
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    • 2.Supervenient states are dependent on their base states, but dependence alone is not sufficient for reduction.
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    • 3.An adequate definition of the reduction-predicate must capture the intuitions that guided the use of the term 'reduction'.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    3 topics

    Modality & Possibility2 linkedCausation1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    An adequate definition of the reduction-predicate must capture the intuitions th...If mental states merely supervene on physiological states, mental states exist o...Kim's causal exclusion argument shows supervenient properties lack causal effica...Nagel's classical model of reduction demands derivability via bridge laws, estab...
    +6 moreShow less
    One central motivation for reduction-talk was to formulate a strictly monist pos...Property identity theories like Lewis's and Armstrong's achieve strict monism pr...

    Similar

    Because supervenience holds even under emergent property dualism, supe...85%A reduction of a concept cannot legitimately presuppose that concept i...82%Global supervenience fails to entail weak individual supervenience81%An adequate definition of the reduction-predicate must capture the int...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: scientific-reduction
    View source passageHide passage
    Supervenience does not fare better, though for different reasons: It seems to be too weak a notion to capture the idea that guided reduction-talk, although it surely is a necessary condition for reduction. In a sense, if mental states merely supervene on physiological states, they exist in a straightforward sense over and above the latter. Such supervenient states are dependent; but being dependent is not enough for reduction (Kim 1998). Note that this is, up to a certain point, a matter of stip
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Reduction requires that higher-level properties be nothing over and above lower-...
    Supervenience entails no explanatory connection: knowing B-facts fixes A-facts w...
    Supervenience makes room for a weak form of dualism, specifically emergent prope...
    Supervenient states are dependent on their base states, but dependence alone is ...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit