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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Supervenience is too weak a notion to constitute reduction, even though supervenience is a necessary condition for reduction.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If mental states merely supervene on physiological states, mental states exist over and above physiological states in a straightforward sense.
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    • 2.Supervenient states are dependent on their base states, but dependence alone is not sufficient for reduction.
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    • 3.An adequate definition of the reduction-predicate must capture the intuitions that guided the use of the term 'reduction'.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Supervenience entails no explanatory connection: knowing B-facts fixes A-facts without explaining why or how, leaving the 'explanatory gap' fully intact.
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    • 2.Kim's causal exclusion argument shows supervenient properties lack causal efficacy, making them epiphenomenal rather than genuinely reduced to physical reality.
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    • 3.Reduction requires that higher-level properties be nothing over and above lower-level properties, but supervenience permits modal covariation without ontological identity.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Nagel's classical model of reduction demands derivability via bridge laws, establishing a logical-nomological connection that mere supervenience never provides.
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    • 2.Property identity theories like Lewis's and Armstrong's achieve strict monism precisely because they eliminate the supervening property rather than merely correlating it with its base.
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