Supervenience without identity merely redescribes the explanatory gap rather than closing it, leaving the grounding relation between institutional and physical properties unexplained.

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Institutional properties(as used in social ontology): Characteristics or features that exist because people have agreed they exist—like the fact that a piece of paper counts as money or that someone has legal authority. They don't exist in nature on their own; they need human agreement to be real.
Physical properties(as used in philosophy of physics): Characteristics of objects that exist in the physical world, like mass, color, size, or temperature—things you could theoretically measure or observe.
explanatory gap(Central concept in anti-physicalist arguments): The alleged in-principle inability to intelligibly explain how consciousness arises from physical processes
grounding relation(the type of connection between bodies and their grounds): The way that one thing serves as the explanation or foundation for another thing's existence.
identity (in philosophy)(whether the trees are actually identical): Sameness or whether two things are actually the same thing, not just very similar.
supervenience(Philosophy of mind and reduction; contrasted with full reduction): A relation in which mental (or higher-level) states are dependent on physiological (or lower-level) states such that any two cases with identical lower-level bases are identical in their higher-level states; a necessary but not sufficient condition for reduction.

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