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    Supervenience physicalism avoids the problem that type ph... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supervenience physicalism avoids the problem that type physicalism faces with institutional properties

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Supervenience physicalism entails only that a property such as having a legal power over lower courts supervenes on physical properties, not that it is identical with a physical property
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    • 2.Type physicalism requires identity between every property and some physical property, which is implausible for institutional or relational properties
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Supervenience without identity merely redescribes the explanatory gap rather than closing it, leaving the grounding relation between institutional and physical properties unexplained.
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    • 2.If supervenience is brute and inexplicable, physicalism about institutional properties collapses into a form of property dualism that abandons genuine physicalist reduction.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Institutional properties like legal jurisdiction are constitutively dependent on collective intentionality and social recognition, which themselves resist supervenience on purely microphysical base properties.
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    • 2.Searle's analysis shows that the same physical configuration can fail to instantiate an institutional property absent the right social context, violating the necessity condition supervenience requires.
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    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    If supervenience is brute and inexplicable, physicalism about institutional prop...Institutional properties like legal jurisdiction are constitutively dependent on...Searle's analysis shows that the same physical configuration can fail to instant...Supervenience physicalism entails only that a property such as having a legal po...
    +2 moreShow less
    Supervenience without identity merely redescribes the explanatory gap rather tha...Type physicalism requires identity between every property and some physical prop...

    Similar

    Type physicalism requires identity between every property and some phy...86%If type physicalism were necessary for physicalism, then every propert...86%Supervenience physicalism avoids the problem that token physicalism fa...86%Token physicalism does not provide a necessary condition for physicali...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: physicalism
    View source passageHide passage
    However, while (4) provides a sufficient condition for physicalism, it does not provide a necessary condition. Consider again the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. If type physicalism is true, then every property that the court has (for example, having a legal power over lower courts) must be identical with some physical property. But on the face of it, that is unlikely. Nevertheless, physicalism might still be true. If so, type physicalism is not necessary for physicalism.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit