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    T* ('True(T)') inherits whatever worldly grounds make T t... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The entailment account of ontological commitment captures ontological costs that the quantifier account misses.

    T* ('True(T)') inherits whatever worldly grounds make T true, so its ontological costs are real even when hidden from surface quantifier structure.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Semantic ascent (moving from T to T*) doesn't eliminate metaphysical commitment; it merely relocates it to abstract truth-bearers.
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    • 2.If T requires worldly grounds, then any proposition about T (including T*) must answer to those same grounds or introduce new costs.
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    • 3.Surface quantifiers ('there exists a truth') obscure real ontological obligations we incur by asserting or presupposing truth-conditions.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.T* may be purely deflationary: asserting T* just commits us to T's truth-conditions, not to additional entities beyond T's grounds.
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    • 2.Semantic ascent can genuinely lighten ontological load by replacing talk of objects with talk of how language represents them.
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    • 3.The claim conflates pragmatic hiddenness (quantifiers aren't explicit) with ontological cost (actual worldly commitment), which diverge.
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    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    If T requires worldly grounds, then any proposition about T (including T*) must ...Semantic ascent (moving from T to T*) doesn't eliminate metaphysical commitment;...Semantic ascent can genuinely lighten ontological load by replacing talk of obje...Surface quantifiers ('there exists a truth') obscure real ontological obligation...
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    T* may be purely deflationary: asserting T* just commits us to T's truth-conditi...The claim conflates pragmatic hiddenness (quantifiers aren't explicit) with onto...The entailment account of ontological commitment captures ontological costs that...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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