Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The entailment account of ontological commitment captures... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The entailment account of ontological commitment captures ontological costs that the quantifier account misses.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine's criterion identifies commitment via canonical notation, but canonical paraphrase is theory-relative, not a neutral logical fact.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If paraphrase choice determines commitment, then switching to T* genuinely masks rather than eliminates ontological costs, confirming the entailment account's superiority.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Hartry Field's fictionalism exploits exactly this paraphrase flexibility, showing the quantifier account is gameable in ways that betray its purpose.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Truthmaker theory, developed by Armstrong and Bigelow, requires that true sentences are made true by entities in the world, not merely by quantificational form.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.T* ('True(T)') inherits whatever worldly grounds make T true, so its ontological costs are real even when hidden from surface quantifier structure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.An adequate account of ontological commitment must track what a theory requires the world to contain, and the entailment account does this where the quantifier account cannot.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Theory T ('∃x K(x)') and theory T* ('True(T)') mutually entail one another, assuming 'K' is not a semantical predicate.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.On the entailment account, mutually entailing theories share the same ontological commitments, so T and T* are both committed to Ks.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A philosopher cannot eliminate her commitment to Ks merely by switching from T to T*, even if T*'s commitment to Ks is only implicit.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    A philosopher cannot eliminate her commitment to Ks merely by switching from T t...An adequate account of ontological commitment must track what a theory requires ...Hartry Field's fictionalism exploits exactly this paraphrase flexibility, showin...If paraphrase choice determines commitment, then switching to T* genuinely masks...
    +7 moreShow less
    On the entailment account, mutually entailing theories share the same ontologica...Quine's criterion identifies commitment via canonical notation, but canonical pa...T* ('True(T)') inherits whatever worldly grounds make T true, so its ontological...The quantifier account is blind to T*'s commitment to Ks because T* has no quant...Theory T ('∃x K(x)') and theory T* ('True(T)') mutually entail one another, assu...Therefore, the quantifier account fails to capture implicit ontological commitme...Truthmaker theory, developed by Armstrong and Bigelow, requires that true senten...

    Similar

    The quantifier account and the entailment account of ontological commi...92%Entailment accounts of ontological commitment handle implicit ontologi...89%Therefore, the quantifier account fails to capture implicit ontologica...89%The quantifier account of ontological commitment requires that only bo...88%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: ontological-commitment
    View source passageHide passage
    For a stark illustration of the difference between entailment and quantifier accounts, consider a theory T that contains the single sentence ‘∃x K(x)’ and the theory T* that contains the single sentence ‘True(T)’ (see Peacock (2011: 81–2), who calls T* a “meta-theory”). T and T* mutually entail one another (assuming ‘K’ is not a semantical predicate); they thus have the same ontological commitments on an entailment account. And this seems right. Surely, a philosopher cannot eliminate her commit
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit