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    Team agency can be incorporated into game theory rather t... — Carmelics
    Home/Democracy & Governance
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    Team agency can be incorporated into game theory rather than treated as an exogenous psychological construct

    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The social model generates an operational definition of group preference
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    • 2.The social model can define truly coordinated choices
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    • 3.Agents in games can formally adapt and settle individual preferences in light of what others prefer and what promotes group stability and efficiency
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Collective intentionality, per Searle and Bratman, is irreducibly first-personal plural ('we intend'), not decomposable into aggregated individual preferences.
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    • 2.Any formal model that reduces 'we-intentions' to transformed individual utility functions smuggles in the explanandum, not a genuine endogenous account of team agency.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Bacharach's 'circumspect team reasoning' requires agents to identify themselves as group members prior to any preference adaptation, presupposing the very team identity the model claims to generate.
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    • 2.An operational definition of group preference derived from individual adaptation cannot explain how agents come to frame their situation in team rather than individual terms in the first place.
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    Topics

    Democracy & GovernanceSocial Contract

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consequentialism1 linked

    Related

    Agents in games can formally adapt and settle individual preferences in light of...An operational definition of group preference derived from individual adaptation...Any formal model that reduces 'we-intentions' to transformed individual utility ...Bacharach's 'circumspect team reasoning' requires agents to identify themselves ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Collective intentionality, per Searle and Bratman, is irreducibly first-personal...The social model can define truly coordinated choicesThe social model generates an operational definition of group preference

    Similar

    Deliberative techniques from game theory also apply to real conversati...76%Determining which type of game agents are actually playing is of criti...76%Team reasoning agents may reframe a situation that individualistic age...75%The strategic forms of relevant games can typically be held fixed when...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    If this were the end of the story, then CGT would be little more than a pre-processing mechanism for identifying standard games. The real innovation lies in representing the influence of concordance considerations on equilibrium determination. The social model can be used to generate an operational definition of group preference, and to define truly coordinated choices. There is no assumption that groups necessarily optimize their preferences or that individual agents coordinate their choices. T
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit