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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The a priori probability that a given property P is a rightmaking property is equal to the a priori probability that P is a wrongmaking property.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz and Aquinas ground moral properties in divine nature or rational teleology, making rightmaking properties conceptually prior to and more numerous than wrongmaking ones.
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    • 2.If rightmaking properties track positive ontological content while wrongmaking properties track privation or absence (as Augustinian privatio boni holds), the two classes are asymmetric in kind.
      ?

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    • 3.An asymmetry in ontological grounding defeats the assumption that the two properties occupy symmetrical positions within a well-defined equiprobable partition.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.The partition 'rightmaking / wrongmaking / neither' contains at least three members, not two, so equal probability is not entailed by P1.
      ?

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    • 2.Many properties (e.g., redness) are morally inert, meaning the family of moral valence properties is not exhaustively binary.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If one has a family of mutually exclusive properties, and P and Q are any two members of that family, then the a priori probability that something has property P is equal to the a priori probability that it has property Q.
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    • 2.The second-order property of being a rightmaking property and the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property belong to a family of mutually exclusive properties.
      ?

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