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    The a priori probability that a given property P is a rig... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The a priori probability that a given property P is a rightmaking property is equal to the a priori probability that P is a wrongmaking property.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If one has a family of mutually exclusive properties, and P and Q are any two members of that family, then the a priori probability that something has property P is equal to the a priori probability that it has property Q.
      ?

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    • 2.The second-order property of being a rightmaking property and the second-order property of being a wrongmaking property belong to a family of mutually exclusive properties.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Leibniz and Aquinas ground moral properties in divine nature or rational teleology, making rightmaking properties conceptually prior to and more numerous than wrongmaking ones.
      ?

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    • 2.If rightmaking properties track positive ontological content while wrongmaking properties track privation or absence (as Augustinian privatio boni holds), the two classes are asymmetric in kind.
      ?

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    • 3.An asymmetry in ontological grounding defeats the assumption that the two properties occupy symmetrical positions within a well-defined equiprobable partition.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The partition 'rightmaking / wrongmaking / neither' contains at least three members, not two, so equal probability is not entailed by P1.
      ?

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    • 2.Many properties (e.g., redness) are morally inert, meaning the family of moral valence properties is not exhaustively binary.
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    Topics

    Problem of Evil

    Related

    An asymmetry in ontological grounding defeats the assumption that the two proper...If one has a family of mutually exclusive properties, and P and Q are any two me...If rightmaking properties track positive ontological content while wrongmaking p...Leibniz and Aquinas ground moral properties in divine nature or rational teleolo...
    +3 moreShow less
    Many properties (e.g., redness) are morally inert, meaning the family of moral v...The partition 'rightmaking / wrongmaking / neither' contains at least three memb...The second-order property of being a rightmaking property and the second-order p...

    Similar

    The a priori probability that a given property P has the second-order ...95%The upper bound on the probability that unknown rightmaking properties...86%The existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a p...86%A priori, there is no reason for supposing that an unknown rightmaking...85%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
    View source passageHide passage
    The question then becomes whether Q expresses a law—or a consequence of a law. If—as seems plausible—it does not, then, although it is true that one in justified in holding, of any given, not yet observed morally relevant property, that it is unlikely to have property J, it may not be the case that it is probable that no goodmaking (or rightmaking) property has property J. It may, on the contrary, be probable that there is some morally relevant property that does have property J.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit