The appearance of contingency in phenomenal-neural identities cannot be explained away by appealing to the reference-fixing of phenomenal terms, since phenomenal properties are directly acquainted rather than picked out via description.

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Contingency(as a value Leibniz wanted to preserve): The quality of something being possible but not necessary—it could be different than it is, or might not happen at all.
Neural identities(as used in philosophy of mind): The idea that conscious experiences (like seeing red) are literally the same thing as brain processes (like neurons firing), not just caused by them.
Phenomenal: # Phenomenal "Phenomenal" means something that is remarkably impressive, outstanding, or extraordinary in a way that stands out noticeably. In everyday use, people call something phenomenal when it exceeds normal expectations and captures attention—like a phenomenal performance or a phenomenal achievement. The word comes from the idea of something being so notable that it appears striking to our perception or experience.
Phenomenal terms(as used in philosophy of mind): Words we use to describe what conscious experiences are like, such as 'red,' 'painful,' or 'bitter.'

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