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    The argument from conceptual independence commits a use-m... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Philosophical zombies (creatures physically identical to humans but lacking consciousness) are genuinely possible.

    The argument from conceptual independence commits a use-mention fallacy: that physical concepts don't mention consciousness doesn't entail that the referents of those concepts are not identical to conscious states.

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    Key Terms

    Identical to(philosophical logic)
    Being exactly the same thing, not just similar or equivalent, but literally one and the same entity.
    Referents(as used in logic and semantics)
    The actual things or objects that a word or term points to or stands for in the real world.
    argument from conceptual independence(as used in philosophy of mind)
    A philosophical argument claiming that because two concepts are separate and don't overlap in meaning, the things they refer to must also be completely separate and different.
    conscious states(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Moments of subjective experience or awareness—like feeling happy, seeing red, or being in pain.
    consciousness(Philosophy of mind; framing the 'What is consciousness?' question)

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    A dynamic process characterized by self-transforming flow, intentional coherence, and semantic self-understanding, rather than a static or momentary state.
    physical concepts(Loar 1999)
    Theoretical concepts, in contrast to recognitional phenomenal concepts.
    use-mention fallacy(as a logical error in reasoning)
    A logical mistake where you confuse the way a word is used in conversation with what the word actually refers to or means—like confusing how people say something with what that something actually is.

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

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    Philosophical zombies (creatures physically identical to humans but lacking cons...

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