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    Philosophical zombies (creatures physically identical to ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Philosophical zombies (creatures physically identical to humans but lacking consciousness) are genuinely possible.

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
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    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Physical science concepts such as neuron, cell, and muscle make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with consciousness.
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    • 2.Physical science concepts are defined in purely physical terms in relevant science texts.
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    • 3.If the concepts used to describe a creature make no reference to consciousness, something could meet those conditions while lacking any connection to consciousness.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, as Kripke's work on necessary a posteriori truths demonstrates.
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    • 2.Water being H2O is necessary but knowable only empirically, showing that physical-mental identity could be similarly necessary despite apparent conceivability gaps.
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    • 3.If consciousness is identical to a physical state, then a being physically identical to a human but lacking consciousness is no more genuinely possible than XYZ that is water but lacks hydrogen.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.The argument from conceptual independence commits a use-mention fallacy: that physical concepts don't mention consciousness doesn't entail that the referents of those concepts are not identical to conscious states.
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    • 2.Type-B physicalists like Ned Block and Joseph Levine grant an explanatory gap in concepts while denying any corresponding ontological gap in nature.
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    • 3.Zombie conceivability therefore tracks only our epistemic situation regarding mind-brain concepts, not a genuine metaphysical possibility in the world.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    3 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPerception1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility, as Kripke's work on nec...If consciousness is identical to a physical state, then a being physically ident...If the concepts used to describe a creature make no reference to consciousness, ...Physical science concepts are defined in purely physical terms in relevant scien...
    +6 moreShow less
    Physical science concepts such as neuron, cell, and muscle make no reference, ex...The argument from conceptual independence commits a use-mention fallacy: that ph...

    Similar

    If zombies are conceivable, then consciousness is not identical to or ...90%If the zombie hypothesis is conceivable and possible, then conscious s...86%The zombie hypothesis claims a body could exist without a mind83%The zombie argument against physicalism fails because zombies are not ...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: dualism
    View source passageHide passage
    It is worth relating the appeal to possibility in this argument to that involved in the more modest, anti-physicalist, zombie argument. The possibility of this hypothesis is also challenged, but all that is necessary for a zombie to be possible is that all and only the things that the physical sciences say about the body be true of such a creature. As the concepts involved in such sciences – e.g., neuron, cell, muscle – seem to make no reference, explicit or implicit, to their association with c
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    There is no parallel clear, uncontroversial, and regimented account of mental co...
    Type-B physicalists like Ned Block and Joseph Levine grant an explanatory gap in...
    Water being H2O is necessary but knowable only empirically, showing that physica...
    Zombie conceivability therefore tracks only our epistemic situation regarding mi...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit